Beijing stumped for an answer to Washington's 'new imperialism

It is an awful prospect for President Jiang Zemin - far worse than a mass strike by laid-off workers, violent peasant protests at taxation, or any domestic upset that might disturb the run-up to the Communist party congress on November 16.

There is Jiang next month, heading for George Bush's ranch at Crawford, Texas, to enjoy a "finger-licking good" barbecue. The Chinese leader has polished his quotations from the Gettysburg Address and even plans to sing a song.

Then just as the Air China No 1 jet sets course across the Pacific, the news flash arrives: Mr Bush has declared "regime change" on Iraq; US planes are bombing Baghdad and special forces are already dropping on selected targets. What is Jiang to do - carry on to the US but call off the ranch visit, or head directly south for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) meeting in Mexico? More difficult still, what is he to say - denounce US unilateralism, call weakly on both sides to show restraint, or . . . just say nothing?

It may not come to such a perplexing pass. This month, when Bush appeared to put the matter in the hands of the UN security council, Beijing breathed a sigh of relief. China was even more relieved when Iraq invited the inspectors back in. The Chinese foreign minister, Tang Jiaxuan, said that was what the world had been waiting for. Perhaps the Iraqi question will somehow be resolved after all without war.

Now, as Bush hardens his line again and seems prepared to stop the inspectors if need be and go it alone, the question has returned. Last week the Chinese prime minister, Zhu Rongji - who happened to be in Vienna, where the International Atomic Energy Agency, home of the inspectors, is based - spelt out the clearest Chinese position so far.

Iraq's "sovereignty, territorial integrity and rational concerns about security should be respected", he said. It was crucial for the inspectors to go back as soon as possible to establish whether Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. "Without irrefutable evidence there should be no use of force, and any major action in this regard should be based on UN authorisation," Mr Zhu stressed.

On the face of it, this commits China to oppose unequivocally any US resort to unilateral war unless President Saddam Hussein misplays his hand very badly by prevaricating with the inspectors. Silence, on this reading, would not be an option for Beijing if it came to the worst.

However, Zhu did not explicitly oppose the new tougher resolution on Iraq that Bush is now pushing: at a press conference he refused to speculate on the subject. Such a resolution, if passed, could then provide a legitimate mandate, acceptable to Beijing, for the use of force.

Twelve years ago, when the US last made war on Iraq, Beijing took this course of action by abstaining on the UN resolution that authorised the the use of force. Beijing's reward was further moves by Washington to normalise relations post-Tiananmen Square. The then foreign minister, Qian Qichen, came to Washington and stood by the president's side at the White House. As James Mann describes it in About Face, his study of the US-China relationship, the US helped China on its "long march to respectability".

So what is the price today of Chinese abstention at the security council and acquiescence in a US war - or is it a deal too far? One view is that Jiang has no alternative, having already committed himself to a foreign strategy which - in spite of such upsets as the Belgrade embassy bombing and the spy-plane crisis - is firmly based upon building a long-term partnership with the US.

His strategy, on this reading, has been reinforced post-September 11 by a shared interest in the "war against terror". Indeed China has already received a down-payment from the US for its support, in Washington's agreement to list the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (Etim) as a terrorist organisation.

The small number of terrorist incidents in China's northwest region of Xinjiang have been lumped together and blamed on Etim, which is said to have links with al-Qaida. Despite US denials, this gives Beijing a green light to crack down without risk of serious criticism as and when it chooses in Xinjiang. Uighur exiles are dismayed at the US decision, which seems to buy a highly dubious Chinese case - though Washington analysts insist their conclusion was reached independently.

China's real aim, argues the exile spokesman Turdi Ghoja, is to isolate the voices of those Uighurs abroad who were beginning to gain US sympathy. It is only two years since Beijing denied there was a separatist movement in Xinjiang and blamed the "200 acts of violence" now attributed to Etim on a variety of groups and individuals. Now the Chinese seek eagerly to "share their secret with the world".

More cynical observers say that the US would have to do more to buy Chinese neutrality - such as backing off the warmer line that the Bush administration has adopted towards the Taiwanese government.

These hard choices, both for the US and for China, will be avoided if the Iraq crisis does not come to war or if, as already suggested, Saddam gives Bush a pretext for action that also satisfies Beijing.

Yet the underlying problem for Beijing remains: how should Chinese foreign policy be structured in the new unipolar world? In the words of one well-known Chinese analyst, Professor Jin Canrong of the People's University, it is a world where it now appears that "the US is seeking absolute domination within the international arena".

How far should Beijing accommodate the "new imperialists"? Will this strengthen or weaken China's own claim to be a world power? And how will Chinese public opinion (no longer to be ignored) react?

For the most part the media have so far avoided any in-depth analysis of US motives and aims. It seems better, as far as possible, not to mention the war - but the questions will not go away.