They barely rate a mention

Cabinet

Lord Butler concludes that the flaws in the September 2002 dossier were the result of collective failure. But his report barely mentions many of the individuals involved.

The cabinet is particularly notable by its absence.

Lord Butler accepts that its members debated Iraq on several occasions ahead of the war but points out that the sessions were impromptu and informal.

As a result, the focus of policy making - and his investigations - was No 10.

As expected, the defence secretary, Geoff Hoon, does not play a significant part in Lord Butler's findings.

The foreign secretary, Jack Straw, will also be relieved that reports predicting he faced criticism proved false.

Campbell

Alastair Campbell (above), although in charge of the Downing Street press machine and involved in writing the dossier, hardly featured in Lord Butler's report yesterday.

He chaired some meetings where the dossier's presentation was discussed but was not called to give evidence. Lord Butler felt his testimony had already been fully gathered by the Hutton inquiry. But Mr Campbell did make a written statement.

Mr Campbell told Lord Hutton that he had given advice on presentational points only during the dossier's drafting, on behalf of the prime minister and at the request of Mr Scarlett. His role was "coordination" of departments involved in the dossier.

Mr Campbell described Mr Scarlett as a "mate". In his report Lord Hutton suggested that Mr Blair's desire to make the dossier as strong as possible may have "subconsciously influenced" Mr Scarlett when he came to write it.

Downing Street aides

Inside No 10 several key figures, including Jonathan Powell (above), Mr Blair's chief of staff, faced possible criticism. No one is singled out, however.

Mr Powell, a loyal ally of the prime minister, is the most notable absentee. He is only mentioned once and is not blamed.

During the drafting of the dossier Mr Powell sent an email to John Scarlett and Alastair Campbell which read: "I think you should redraft the para. My memory of the intelligence is that he [Saddam] has set up plans to use CBW [chemical or biological weapons] on western forces." The wording in the dossier was changed.

When asked who should take the blame for the intelligence blunders, Lord Butler said yesterday: "It was a weakness on the part of all those who were involved in putting together the dossier, which included members of the JIC and all others concerned. I think that they collectively have to take responsibility."

Intelligence officials

Lord Butler went out of his way in his report to call for John Scarlett, then chairman of the joint intelligence committee but since appointed to head MI6, to keep his new post.

Mr Scarlett was one of the few officials connected to the intelligence services whose identities were revealed in the report.

Mr Scarlett compiled the September 2002 dossier on Saddam's alleged weapons with the assistance of Alastair Campbell.

Within No 10 Mr Scarlett communicated during the writing of the dossier with several key figures including Jonathan Powell.

Sir Richard Dearlove, the outgoing head of MI6, is also mentioned in the report but not specifically blamed for intelligence failings.

Three other members of the intelligence community who gave evidence to the inquiry were not named or blamed.